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Louthian: Physical Injury Arising Out of Fear for the Safety of a Third Per

PHYSICAL INJURY ARISING OUT OF FEAR FOR THE
SAFETY OF A THIRD PERSON IN NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS
The purpose of this article is to examine the rules oi law in those
cases which involve a personal injury to the plaintiff occasioned by
fear for the safety of a third party who was placed in a position of
peril by a negligent act or omission of the defendant. In order to
cast light upon this particular subject, it will be necessary to delve
into the law of emotional and mental disturbances as causes of action
in the law of torts, but this will be done briefly and only in passing.
INTENTIONAL TORTS

The common law has been reluctant to recognize the interest in
one's peace of mind as deserving of independent legal protection,
even as against an intentional invasion such as an assault, unless it
involved a threat to the peace of the community. More recently,
injuries occasioned by invasions of intangible rights have been recognized as valid causes of action in torts such as libel, slander and
invasion of the right of privacy.
The general rule today is that recovery will be allowed in those
cases where injury was caused by the wilful act of the defendant
even though the harm to the plaintiff resulted through fear.] This
rule is based on the reasoning that the defendant should be held
absolutely liable, having acted wilfully with the intent to cause harm
to someone, although the intent was not necessarily directed toward
the plaintiff. In the case of a wanton or intentional wrong causing
fright and mental suffering resulting in physical injury, the element

of fright does not sever the causal connection between the wrong
and the resulting injury.2 It is quite clear that where the wilful act

of the defendant is directed toward the plaintiff, and the plaintiff
thereby suffers injury or illness from fright, the right of recovery
is recognized. In Blakely v. Shortal's Estate3 the court held that the
plaintiff had a case for the jury when she discovered the gory body
of a suicide in her home. It was held that if the jury found that
the decedent acted wilfully, with the intention of frightening the
plaintiff, the decedent's estate would be liable.
A split of authority is apparent in those cases where the wilful
act is directed toward another person, and not toward the plaintiff.
1. 4 SH3EARIS & REDFreL, NtGLIGNCM § 856, p. 1948 (1941 rev. ed.).
2. State Rubbish Collector's Association v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.
2d 282 (1952).
3. 236 Iowa 787, 20 N. IV. 2d 28, noted in 44 Mich. L. R. 486 (1945).
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The better rule seems to be based on the doctrine of transferred intent and the defendant is held liable. This was so held in Rogers v.
Williard4 where a trespasser, by brandishing a pistol, threatened a
third party in the presence of the plaintiff. Although there was no
actual violence toward the plaintiff, the court held the defendant
liable for the suffering of the plaintiff who experienced a miscarriage
as a result of her fright. However, in Goddard v. Watters5 a complaint was held to state no cause of action where it alleged in
substance that the defendant, in the presence of the plaintiff, threatened to shoot the plaintiff's husband. The plaintiff suffered great fright
and shock which resulted in a breakdown mentally and physically.
The latter case seems to be in direct conflict with the vast weight
of authority6 and the more modern view adopted by the American
7
Law Institute in its Restatement of the Law of Torts:
If the actor intentionally and unreasonably subjects another
to emotional distress which he should recognize as likely to
result in illness or other bodily harm, he is subject to liability
to the other for any illness or other bodily harm of which the
distress is a legal cause,
(1) although the actor has no intention of inflicting such
harm, and
(2) irrespective of whether the act is directed against the
other or a third person.
NiGLIG=NCE CASZS

The law with respect to cases where the plaintiff suffered illness
or injury as a result of fright caused by a negligent defendant is in
a state of confusion. Some jurisdictions state absolutely that no recovery will be allowed where the plaintiff suffered no "impact" as
a result of the defendant's negligent act. 8 This rule was laid down
in New York in the case of Mitchell v. Rochester Ry.,9 where the
plaintiff was frightened by a team of horses driven by an agent of
the defendant, narrowly missing the plaintiff. The court refused to
allow recovery for the miscarriage and ensuing illness of the plaintiff
4. 144 Ark. 587, 223 S. W. 15 (1920).
5. 14 Ga. App. 722, 82 S. E. 304, 7 N.C.C.A. 1 (1914).

6. May v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 157 N. C. 416, 72 S. E. 1059,
37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 912 (1911): Meagher v. Driscoll, 99 Mass. 281, 96 Am.
Dec. 759 (1868); cases cited in 12 Ann. Cas. at page 744.
7. 2 RESTATtmENT, ToRTs § 312 (1934).
8. Mahoney v. Dankwart, 108 Iowa 321, 79 N. W. 134 (1899); Ellsworth
v. Massacar, 215 Mich. 511, 184 N. W. 408 (1921); Southern Ry. v. Jackson,
146 Ga. 243, 91 S. E. 28 (1916). See, however, Kelly v. Lowney, 113 Mont.
385, 126 P. 2d 486 (1942).

9. 151 N. Y. 107, 45 N. B. 354 (1896).
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as it was stated flatly that "no recovery could be had for injuries
sustained by fright occasioned by the negligence of another, where
there is no immediate personal injury." It is clear that the court
intended the term "personal injury" to be synonomous with some
physical impact to the person of the plaintiff. The rule of the Mitchell
case is still the law in New York and at least eleven other states.' 0
The rule in South Carolina is that no impact is required as a condition precedent to the plaintiff's right of recovery. In the recent
case of Padgett v. Colonial Wholesale Distributing Co.,11 the plaintiff
was in his home watching television when his house was struck by
a truck driven by an agent of the defendant. The plaintiff subsequently suffered a neurodermatitis, fever, loss of appetite and rapid loss of
weight. judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed as the Court held
that if the jury found that the bodily injury of the plaintiff was caused
by the shock, fright and emotional upset as a result of the negligence
and wilflUilness of the defendant, he was entitled to recover. The
Court cited with approval the case of Sloane v. Southern California
Ry.,12 where it was stated that it is immaterial whether the cause of
the injury is direct, as by some blow, or indirect, through some
action on the mind. The test is one of proximate cause, and if the
act of the defendant set in motion the agencies which produced
the injury, the right of recovery exists, said the Court.
Where the mental disturbance and its consequences are not caused
by any fear for the plaintiff's own safety, but by some peril or
harm to another person, as in the case of the shock of a mother
witnessing the death of her child, there is still less agreement than
there is in those cases involving only a threat to the plaintiff's
own safety. The courts which require an "impact" to the person of
the plaintiff, of course, deny recovery ;l3 but even some of the courts
which no longer insist on "impact" refuse to find a cause of action.' 4
10. See St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. R. v. Bragg, 69 Ark. 402, 64 S. W. 226

(1901) ; Braun v. Craven, 175 Ill. 401, 51 N. E. 657 (1898) ; Kramer v. Ricksmeier, 159 Iowa 48, 139 N. W. 1091 (1913); Morse v. Chesapeake & Ohio
Ry., 117 Ky. 11, 77 S. W. 361 (1903); Herrick v. Evening Express Publishing
Co., 120 Me. 138, 113 Atl. 6 (1921); Spade v. Lynn & Boston R. R., 168
Mass. 285, 47 N. E. 88 (1897); Nelson v. Crawford, 122 Mich. 466, 81 N. W.
335 (1899) ; Strange v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 61 Mo. App. 586 (1869) ; Ward v.
W. J. & S. R. R., 65 N. J. L. 383, 47 Adt. 561 (1900); Miller v. Baltimore

& 0. S. W. R., 78 Ohio St. 309, 85 N. R. 499 (1908); Morris v. L. & W. V.
R. R., 228 Pa. 198, 77 AtI. 445 (1910).
11. 232 S. C. 593, 103 S. E. 2d 265 (1958).
12. 111 Cal. 668, 44 Pac. 320, 32 L. R.
13. See cases cited in note 8 supra.
14. Nuckles v. Tennessee Electric Power
(1927); Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. R.
N. R. 917 (1900); Sanderson v. Northern

A. 193.

Co., 155 Tenn. 611, 299 S. W. 775
v. Stewart, 24 Ind. App. 374, 56
Pac. Ry., 88 Minn. 162, 92 N. W.

542, 60 L. R. A. 403, 97 Am. St. Rep. 509 (1902).
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The reason usually assigned for denying recovery, is that the defendant was under no duty of conduct toward the plaintiff, since no
harm to him was to be anticipated. 15 This view which denies recovery' 6 is adopted by the Restatement, as is shown in the following
excerpt :17
One who unintentionally but negligently subjects another to
an emotional distress does not take the risk of any exceptional
physical sensitiveness to emotion which the other may have,
unless the circumstances known to the actor should apprise him
thereof. Thus, one who negligently drives an auto through a
city street and who, therefore, injures or imperils a third
person is not required to take into account the possible presence
at the scene of the accident of someone who is so constituted
that the shock of witnessing the accident may cause her a distress
which in view of her peculiar physical makeup may bring about
an illness.
However, note this qualification :18
Caveat: The institute expresses no opinion as to whether an
actor whose conduct is negligent as involving an unreasonable
risk of causing bodily harm to a child or spouse is liable for an
illness or other bodily harm caused to the parent or spouse who
witnesses the peril or harm of the child or spouse and thereby
suffers anxiety or shock which is the legal cause of the parent's
or spouse's illness or other bodily harm.
The rule denying the right of recovery has been recently reaffirmed
by a Utah decision. 19 There it was held that there could be no recovery for fright and shock suffered by a father, where a fire occurred
at night in his home as a result of the negligent installation of certain
appliances by the defendants and he had awakened to discover the
fire, knowing his children were upstairs. Although his children were
not injured, he allegedly experienced extreme mental and physical
shock. Under Utah law it was conceded that recovery could not be
allowed for fright or shock alone in the absence of some bodily or
15. Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N. W. 497, 98 A. L. R. 394

(1935).
16. Recovery for the physical consequences of fright at another's peril has
generally been denied. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. R. v. Stewart, note 14 supra;
Mahoney v. Dankvart, 108 Iowa 321, 79 N. W. 134 (1897) ; McGee v. Vanover,
148 Ky. 737, 147 S. IV. 742, Ann. Cas. 1913E 500 (1912); Chesapeake &
Ohio R. R. v. Robinett, 151 Ky. 778, 152 S. W. 976, 45 L. R. A. (N. S.) 433
(1913) ; Smith v. Johnson & Co., unreported English case referred to in Dulieu
v. White, 2 K. B. 669 at 675 (1901).
17. 2 RESTAIEMENT, TORTS § 313 comment b (1934).
18. Ibid.
19. Preece v. Baur, 143 F. Supp. 804 (E. D. Idaho 1956).
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physical injury where the acts complained of constituted merely acts
of ordinary negligence and were not wilful or wanton.
The precise question was raised in 1925 in England in the landmark case of Hambrook v. Stokes Brothers.2 0 A woman became
frightened for the safety of her children whom she believed would
be injured by a motor vehicle which the defendant left unattended
and which ran down an incline. It was held in an action for her
wrongful death that her husband was entitled to recover, notwithstanding that the shock was brought about by fear for her children's
safety, and not by fear for her own. The decision in this case has
been accepted, rejected, modified, explained, distinguished and forced
to undergo various indignities, when, if examined closely, it will be
shown that the ruling in the case was sound. Notice that the opinion
by Arkin, L. J., in the Hambrook case restricted recovery on the
principle laid down in that case to those cases where the following
factors appear:
(1) -The facts must be. essentially the same as those in the
Hambrook case.
(2) The proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury must be the
negligent act of the defendant.
(3) The plaintiff must actually see the threat to the safety of
the third party or realize the danger from her "unaided
senses."
(4) The fear must be for herself or her children.
In Bowman v. Williams,2 1 which is the leading American case in
point with the Hambrook case, the defendant negligently ran his truck
into the basement of the plaintiff's house, and although the plaintiff
did not sustain any physical impact, he sustained a shock to his
nervous system because of his fright and alarm for the safety of
his children who were in the basement of the house. In holding that
a recovery might be had for the nervous shock, the court said:
With respect to the present inquiry, the primary effect of this
wrongful act upon the personality of the plaintiff was the fright
it caused him, since his person was untouched, although the possession under his demise was invaded. In fright, a man's whole
being reacts. The shock to his nervous system is reflected in
instinctive excitement and intensive action of the muscles and
organs of the body, and so it is clear that the mental state has
a corresponding physical accompaniment, although there has
20. 1 K. B. 141 (1925).
21. 164 Md. 397, 165 AtI. 182 (1933).
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been no impact suffered. The fear is as bad as falling. Nor does
the cause of the fear afford any standard of measurement of its
consequences. When fear exists, the nervous and physical reactions, although probably differing in degree, are fundamentally
identical, whether the fear is purely subjective as it is for the
victim's own safety, or is objective. The effect of fright being
unpredictable, there is neither logic nor reason to hold, with
some of the cases, that a distinction is to be taken, so that, if a
party suffers an injury, as loss of health of mind, or of life,
through fear of safety for self, a recovery may be had for the
negligent act of another; but may not recover under similar
22
circumstances, if the fear be of safety for another.
There are two leading American cases contra to the Ham brook and
Bownman cases. In Waube v. Warrington2 3 it was held that one who
sustained the shock of witnessing the negligent killing of her child
could not recover for physical injuries caused by such fright or shock,
where she herself was not placed in peril or fear of physical impact.
The court held there could be no recovery for physical injuries
sustained by a person out of the range of ordinary physical peril, as
a result of the shock of witnessing another's danger. The opinion by
Wickhem, J., in sustaining defendant's demurrer, relied heavily on
Cardozo's opinion in the Palsgraf2 4 case, by finding no duty owed
by the defendant to persons in the class of the plaintiff. Hambrook
v. Stokes Brothers was rejected, because the court's opinion in the
Hambrook case emphasized proximate cause rather than duty. The
dissent in the Hambrook case was adopted in which the court stated
that once the doctrine starts, no rational boundaries can be set. Also,
the court disapproved of the arbitrary opinion in the Hambrook
case which limited the relationship to parent and child. It was stated
that the liability imposed by such a doctrine was wholly out of proportion to the culpability of the negligent tort feasor, and would
put an unreasonable burden upon the users of the highway, open
22. Accord: Frazee v. Western Dairy Products Co., 182 Wash. 578, 47 P.
2d 1037 (1935) ; Spearman v. McCrary, 4 Ala. App. 473, 58 So. 927 (1912) ;
Gulf, C. & S. F. R. R. v. Coopwood, 96 S. W. 102 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906);
Cohn v. Ansonia Realty Co., 162 App. Div. 791, 148 N. Y. S. 39 (1914) ; s. c.,
162 App. Div. 794, 148 N. Y. S. 41 (1914).
23. 216 Wis. 603, 258 N. W. 497 (1935).
24. Palsgraf v. Long Island R. R., 248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99, 59 A. L. R.
1253 (1928). Here, the plaintiff was denied recovery when injured by scales
which fell from a railroad platform as the result of an explosion occasioned
by the dropping of a package of fireworks by a passenger who was being
helped aboard the train by an agent of the defendant.
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the way to fraudulent claims, and enter a field that had no sensible
or just stopping point.
In Cote v. Litawa,2 5 which is also contra to the Hambrook and
Bowuman cases, the defendant, having injured a child by the negligent operation of his automobile, carried her upstairs to her pregnant
mother. The mother had heard a commotion outside and had heard
someone call out the child's name just prior to the defendant bringing the child to her. To recover damages for shock and fright, with
ensuing physical consequences, the mother instituted the action, and
her husband sought to recover for the loss of consortium of his wife
resulting therefrom. The court held there could be no recovery because the consequences of the defendant's act were such an unusual
and extraordinary result of the careless operation of an automobile
that to impose liability therefor would place an unreasonable burden
upon users of the highways.
The facts of Waisbe v. Warrington are indistinguishable in principle from the recent English case of King v. Phillips.26 In that
case, a taxi driver backed his cab, without looking, onto a child's
tricycle, slightly injuring the child. The child's mother, who was
in a house about sixty yards down a side street, heard her child
scream, and, looking out of the window, saw the taxi slowly backing over the tricycle. She could not see the child, and she immediately
ran downstairs and into the street where she met the child running
towards her. She suffered nervous shock as a result of her experience.
The trial judge held that she could not recover as she was outside
the area of physical danger, and there was therefore no breach of duty
towards her. The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, but with
different reasons given by each Lord Justice. The essential question
should have been whether it could reasonably be foreseen that a
mother would suffer nervous shock as a -result of immediate fear
for her child's safety. Singleton and Hodson, L. J., held that no
duty existed on the ground that the plaintiff was outside the area
of physical danger. If it is to be admitted that a woman can reasonably
be expected to suffer nervous shock as a result of apprehension for
the safety of her child (and Singleton, L. J., seems to admit this),
it is difficult to see how her distance from the accident can qualify
this foresight, providing she is in a position to appreciate the nature
and quality of the immediate threat to her child. Denning, L. J.,
held that a duty did exist under the circumstances, but that the
25. 96 N. H. 174, 71 A. 2d 792, 18 A. L. R. 2d 216 (1950).
26. 1 Q. B. 429 (1953).
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damage was too remote a consequence of the negligence, as a taxi
driver could not reasonably be expected to have foreseen that the
slow backing of his cab would terrify a mother seventy yards away.
He distinguished the Hambrook case on the ground that there the
lorry driver ought to have foreseen that a runaway lorry might
seriously shock the mother of her children in the danger area. It is
suggested that this "reasonable foresight" test applied by Denning,
L. J., is the result of careful reasoning and is the best test to be
applied in these cases.
The cases which refuse the right of the plaintiff to recover place
the accent then on duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, while
those courts recognizing the right place the emphasis on the proximate
cause of the injury to the plaintiff. Should there really be a distinction
between the reasoning of the courts on this question? It is submitted
that there should be no such distinction. The area of foreseeable risk
must in every case be a question of fact depending on the particular
circumstances. This is a question which is not peculiar to the shock
cases but arises whenever reasonable foresight is at issue. The area
of physical risk doctrine is not necessary for the purpose of enabling
the courts to reject extravagant claims. The ordinary reasonable foresight doctrine will give sufficient protection in such cases. If the
area of risk in the shock cases is limited to the area in which physical
injury to the person who receives the shock ought to have been in
the contemplation of the defendant, then it is clear that the mother
in the Hambrook case was never within that area. On the other hand,
if the necessary foresight is concerned only with foresight that a
person may receive a shock when witnessing an accident or by becoming immediately aware of it by his own senses as in the Hambrook
case, then anyone within eyesight or earshot is within the required
''emotional" area.
The confusion between foresight of emotional injury and foresight of physical injury is due to four reasons which are not always
recognized: (1) Confusion among the courts in the different tests
applicable to physical injuries and emotional injuries with reference
to foresight. (2) Confusion of the cases where emotional injuries
follow physical injuries with those cases where physical injuries
follow emotional injuries. (3) The courts' using "the area of physical
risk" concept as a scientific or mechanical answer to the scope of
the defendant's responsibility. (4) The courts' contentions that allowing recovery would greatly enlarge the extent of the duty of care.
This is not valid reasoning. If it is reasonable and just that a person
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should be held liable under certain circumstances, why should he
escape liability merely because there is a possibility that others in
similar circumstances will also seek to recover? Fear of spurious
claims is an unsatisfactory foundation on which to build a legal
doctrine. If it is argued that such an extension may lead to illegitimate claims, the answer is that similar fears expressed when shock
was first recognized as a cause of action have proved to be groundless. In fact, the only rational and satisfactory test is one based on
reasonable foresight that the wrongful act may, in the circumstances
of the particularcase, give to another person so violent a shock that
physical injury may result from it. The nature of the accident, the
position of the person who received the shock, the relationship between the person who received the shock and the person who has
been injured, are all facts which may be relevant in determining liability, but no one of them can be regarded as conclusive.
The law endeavors to afford a redress for wrongs committed on
the plaintiff by the defendant. Where the courts deny that the plaintiff even has a cause of action because of a play on such words as
"duty", "area of risk", and "foreseeability", and fail to recognize the
fact that the plaintiff has been injured as a direct and proximate
result of the defendant's negligent act, it seems that the defendant is
receiving the benefit of the rule, when in fact, the interests of both
parties should be balanced.
In the present state of scientific knowledge and with the danger
of imposture, is it expedient to allow the plaintiff to trace the causal
connection through a psychic link in the chain of causation? When
the defendant leaves a truck negligently unattended at the top of
a steep hill, he subjects others to the risks of being: (1) run over
directly; (2) run over while rescuing someone; (3) injured while
getting out of the way; (4) frightened and fainting from excitement;
(5) frightened and suffering a physical injury through shock induced
by fear for the safety of another. All of these possible events are
dangerous to the safety of others. In the case of a bystander being
injured through shock at the sight of injury to a third person, the
difficulty of proving causation would of course be great, and the trial
judge should direct a verdict for the defendant unless the proof offered by the plaintiff is very substantial and very persuasive. If, in
rescue cases, where a defendant in negligently putting one person in
peril, is held to be at the same time negligent toward potential rescuers who might be drawn into the zone of danger to extricate the
,€.
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imperiled person, 2 7 it would seem a fortiori that the mother of a
child so endangered would be allowed recovery for physical injuries
resulting from witnessing the incident. The light of ordinary experience would seem to show that it is more foreseeable that a mother
might be so injured than a rescuer in the same circumstances.
CONCLUSIONS
It is obvious that if recovery is to be permitted there must be some
limitations. It would be an entirely unreasonable burden on all human
activity if the defendant were compelled to pay for the lacerated feelings of every person shocked at an accident, or every distant relative
of the person injured; and the danger of fictitious claims, and the
necessity for some guarantee of genuineness, should be given much
consideration.
Some such limitations are suggested. It is clear that the injury
threatened or inflicted upon the third person must be a serious one,
of a nature to cause severe shock to the plaintiff2 s and that the shock
must result in actual physical harm.2 9 These requirements, if strictly
adhered to, would do much to eliminate false claims.
As an additional safeguard, it has been said that the plaintiff must
be present at the time of the accident, or at least that the shock must
be fairly contemporaneous with it,30 rather than following at a later
date.al Such limitations are necessary in order not to leave the
liability of a negligent defendant open to undue extension by the
verdicts of sympathetic juries. Within some such limits, it is suggested that a rule imposing liability may ultimately be adopted.
It appears that liability in negligence actions will become established as it now is in wilful torts if the negligently caused shock and
resulting physical injury is reasonably foreseeable. The only distinction between wilful and negligent shock is that in the former the
27. Wagner v. International Ry., 232 N. Y. 176, 133 N. E. 437 (1921).
28. Sperier v. Ott, 116 La. 1087, 41 So. 323, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 518 (1906).
29. Keyes v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. R., 36 Minn. 290, 30 N. W. 888 (1886);
Wyman v. Leavitt, 71 Me. 227, 36 Am. Rep. 303 (1880).
30. Hambrook v. Stokes Bros., 1 K. B. 141, 152, 94 L. J. K. B. 435 (1925).
31. See Huston v. Freemansburg Borrough, 212 Pa. 548, 61 Atl. 1022, 3
L. R. A. (N. S.) 49 (1905); Kalleg v. Fassio, 125 Cal. App. 96, 13 P. 2d
763 (1932); Chester v. Council of Waverly, 38 N. S. W. S. R. 603; noted,
55 L. Q. R. 495, 17 Can. B. R. 541 (1938). The plaintiff's evidence indicated
that the defendant had negligently left unprotected in a street a deep, waterfilled trench into which the plaintiff's son fell and was drowned. Several hours
later the plaintiff was a member of the party which discovered the child's body.
She suffered a severe nervous shock resulting in illness. Held, for defendant,
upholding directed verdict. Assuming that, under the rule of Hambrook v.
Stokes Brothers, a negligent person may be liable for illness resulting from
nervous shock caused to one -who witnesses a harrowing spectacle, the doctrine
does not extend to persons not present at the time of the accident.
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foresight of shock is absolute, being intentional, while in the latter
it is relative, depending on the facts of the particular case.
If the person threatened is a husband, wife or child of the person
receiving the shock, the foreseeability is, of course, greater than in
other circumstances, but it is a gloomy view of human nature which
suggests that the sight of the death or injury of someone else cannot
create such a shock. It must always be a question of reasonable foresight and this cannot depend on arbitrary categories such as family
relationships.
Recovery in those cases where the plaintiff is merely told of the
accident and thus suffers shock should be denied on the basis of
ordinary human experience.
It is submitted that the courts in the future will grant the right
of recovery in those cases similar in principle to the Hambrook case.
If the cases seem to be in a state of confusion at the present time,
this is primarily because the field is relatively new and the number of
cases arising on this theory have been few. As is so aptly stated by
Mr. Justice Holmes :32 "If a consistent pattern cannot yet be clearly
discerned in the cases, this but indicates that the law on this subject
is in a process of growth."
Hi
RT W. LOUTHIAN.

32. HoLmES, THZ COMMON LAw 36
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